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I. INTRODUCTION
HE United States and the rest of the world are experiencing a
financial crisis - coined the "Great Unwind" - in which trillions of
dollars of leveraged debt is being removed from global financial
markets,1 leaving in its wake bank failures, government bailouts, volatile
equity markets, and fear of recession. At the core of the issue in the
United States is America's housing boom and subsequent bust,2 which
has seen foreclosures reach alarming levels. In 2006, home ownership in
*Eric C. Seitz, J.D., 2008, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.S. Business 1993, Miami University. This article is dedicated to my wife Su-
sanne, whose unwavering support make my legal education possible. I forever will
be grateful.
1. Rick Newman, A New Direction on Wall Street, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP, Sept.
29, 2008, at 22.
2. Id.
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the United States reached record highs, fueled in large part by the availa-
bility of "subprime" funds. 3 Indeed, at the end of 2006, as much as 14
percent of the outstanding mortgage debt in the United States was
through subprime loans. 4 In 2007, the amount due on many on these
loans began to rise (either through adjustable interest or balloon pay-
ments), while housing prices fell.5 An alarmingly large percentage of
these subprime loans are "predatory," often very efficiently (and not so
discreetly) designed to achieve foreclosure of the mortgages backing
them.6
Theories and proposals on how to address the problem dominate the
headlines. Within the federal government, there is strong disagreement
on what needs "fixing"-the mortgage industry itself or industry regula-
tion.7 Regardless, there seems to be a quest for - and an expectation of -
a "quick fix" solution. Seemingly lost in the commotion is "The Mort-
gage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007,"8 a bill passed by
the U.S. House of Representatives in 2007. This legislation at first glance
might appear to be a hasty reaction to the acute pains of the current
mortgage crisis, but upon examination promises to be a well-laid founda-
tion upon which to fix permanently the problem.
This comment is divided into six sections. In parts II and III, it ana-
lyzes the advent and rise of subprime and predatory lending in the United
States. Part IV explores and critiques pertinent theories and current fed-
eral legislation addressing the issue of predatory lending, and part V ex-
plores the legislative history of The Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act and discusses the merits of the proposed legisla-
tion. The comment concludes in Part VI by calling for a bi-partisan, bi-
cameral effort to enact it into law.
3. Lynne F. Riley, The Bankruptcy Perspective: Predatory Lending in the Home Mort-
gage Market, NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW 353, 353 (2007).
4. Id. Given the law of averages, and that subprime loans are usually smaller than
their prime counterparts, one could deduce that the percentage of subprime loans
relative to total loans is even higher. See Department of the Treasury and Housing
and Urban Development, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, at 27-28
(June 20, 2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf
(last visited Apr. 15, 2008) [hereinafter HUD Report].
5. David Anderson, The Subprime Lending Crisis, 71 TEX. B.J. 20, 20 (2008).
6. See Creola Johnson, Stealing the American Dream: Can Foreclosure-Rescue Com-
panies Circumvent New Laws Designed to Protect Homeowners From Equity
Theft?, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 649, 656 (2007).
7. The Bush Administration opted for the latter approach when it unveiled a plan to
reorganize the complicated federal regulatory regime by creating three federal
agencies - the Federal Reserve serving as a "market stability" regulator, a "pru-
dential financial" regulator, which would take over the function of several separate
banking regulators and a "business conduct regulator," taking over many of the
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Maura Reynolds, Ex-
panded Fed Power Proposed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008.
8. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th
Cong. (2007).
H.R. 3915
II. THE SUBPRIME MARKET
Although "legitimate subprime loans and predatory loans are analyti-
cally distinct,"9 a good understanding of predatory lending begins with an
analysis of the subprime market.
The lending market in the United States consists of three segments: the
prime market, the legitimate subprime market, and the predatory mar-
ket. 10 The prime market caters to the most creditworthy borrowers and is
dominated by traditional, deposit-backed institutions. The subprime
market generally offers beneficial credit to less creditworthy borrowers,
and the predatory market is "a subset of players within the [subprime]
market who employ deceptive and abusive practices to cheat customers
out of their hard-earned money."11 Not all subprime loans are predatory,
but almost all predatory loans are subprime. 12
Access to the subprime market is "necessary and appropriate" to those
with poor or unverifiable credit. 13 Subprime lending increases economic
prospects, especially in low-to-moderate income neighborhoods. 14 Thus,
the challenge for a subprime lender is to provide a market for non-prime
borrowers without being labeled as predatory. 15 Within the subprime
market exists tension between good public policy (access to credit) with
bad lending practices (adhesion and unconscionability), and as a result
subprime lending is "one of the most important public policy issues that
America will have to address during the coming years.' 16
Subprime lending has experienced tremendous growth since its incep-
tion in the 1980s. 17 In 1983, 1.4 percent of all loans were considered sub-
prime.' 8 By 1998, fully 10 percent of all loans were subprime,' 9 and in
2006, 14 percent of the $10 trillion in mortgage debt in the United States
was subprime.20 The popularity of subprime lending is directly attributa-
ble to several factors. On the consumer side, a rise in consumer credit
problems has alienated a large portion of the population from prime
9. Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Eco-
nomics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002).
10. Id. at 1279.
11. Laurie A. Burlingame, A Pro-Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending: En-
hanced Protection Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to Education,
60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 460, 460 (2006).
12. Anne-Marie Motto, Comment, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lend-
ers are Destroying the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (2002).
While predatory loans are not necessarily subprime, they are most prevalent in the
subprime market. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1261.
13. Motto, supra note 10, at 863.
14. Christopher A. Richardson, The Community Reinvestment Act and the Economics
of Regulatory Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (2002).
15. Riley, supra note 3, at 353.
16. Cathy L. Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved With Good Con-
gressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market,
51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 475 (2000).
17. Id. at 527.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Anderson, supra note 5, at 20; see also Riley, supra note 3, at 353.
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funds.2' The lack of health coverage has forced many people to resort to
home equity loans to pay their medical bills. 22 Moreover, the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 eliminated the deductibility of most interest payments
except those made on a mortgage, which encourages debt consolidation
secured by home mortgages. 23
From the lender's perspective, subprime loans often are more profita-
ble than their prime counterparts. 24 The capital available to fund sub-
prime loans has increased dramatically because of the packaging of loan-
backed securities available to institutional investors. 25 Moreover, many
lenders take advantage of incentives offered through federal programs to
increase lending activity in low-to-moderate income neighborhoods. 26
III. PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
Representative David Scott of Georgia referred to predatory lending
as "the eye of the storm" of the subprime lending crisis.27 Despite such a
strong reputation, no statute or regulation defines "predatory lending."'28
While some predatory lending practices are fraudulent, in isolation most
are perfectly legal-even appropriate. To define predatory lending is dif-
ficult, but to grasp the concept is not.29 Justice Potter Stewart's famous
definition of pornography, "I know it when I see it," 30 easily could apply
to predatory lending.
In general, a loan may be considered predatory if it results in the bor-
rower's loss of equity, requires higher monthly payments than originally
promised, provides a larger than needed loan amount, or is designed to
foreclose. 3' A predatory lender targets borrowers who are easily
manipulated or misled, are more likely to receive the first credit offer
they receive, and are in need of immediate funds. 32 Such borrowers are
usually overrepresented by minorities, single women, the elderly, and the
poorly educated, 33 and generally live in areas underserved by traditional
21. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 30.
22. Mansfield, supra note 16, at 531.
23. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 30. By 2006, home ownership in the United States
had reached an all-time high of 69%, and many low-income homeowners took
advantage of interest deductibility from junior mortgages. Mansfield, supra note
16, at 531; Riley, supra note 1, at 353.
24. Mansfield, supra note 16, at 531.
25. Anderson, supra note 5, at 20. The vast majority of subprime loans are securitized
and sold in the secondary market. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turn-
ing a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2039, 2040 (2007).
26. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1276. See, e.g., The Cmty. Reinvestment Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006).
27. 153 Cong. Rec. 178, H13965 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007).
28. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 17.
29. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1260.
30. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring).
31. Motto, supra note 12, at 866-67.
32. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 17-18.
33. Nicolas Bagley, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending
Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2278 (2004).
H.R. 3915
lenders and meaningful competition. 34
Predatory lenders build strong relationships of trust with borrowers, 35
and they prey on borrowers' beliefs that they are "lucky" to have found
someone who is willing to lend them money and is who looking out for
their best interest.36 Unfortunately, often the opposite is true.37 For ex-
ample, a favorite predatory lending practice is "granny shopping"-
targeting elderly people with significant equity in their home but little
cash to pay for mounting healthcare bills.3 8 The effects can be
devastating. 39
Another hallmark of predatory lending is "equity-stripping. '40 Articu-
lated in the harshest and most pessimistic terms, through equity-stripping
lenders steal money, in the form of home equity, from borrowers. 4 1 Eq-
uity-stripping is achieved primarily through a practice known as "loan-
flipping," where lenders persuade homeowners to refinance mortgages
repeatedly in short intervals. 42 Closing costs and prepayment penalties
are wrapped into the amount financed, which quickly devours any equity
in the property and eventually leads to default. 43 This practice is never-
theless attractive to borrowers in the short term because it usually lowers
monthly payments by extending the maturity of the loan.44 Equity strip-
ping is also achieved through "loan-packing," where lenders bundle mort-
gage insurance and other unnecessary add-ons into the loan, often
without borrowers' knowledge or consent. 45
Predatory loans known as "asset-based loans" are issued without re-
gard for the borrower's ability to repay,46 and are underwritten based on
the value of the property itself.47 Since the borrower usually cannot af-
ford the monthly payments, foreclosure is the primary objective. 48 Other
predatory lending practices include issuing loans with negative amortiza-
34. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 17-18. The practice of promoting high-cost loans in
predominantly low-income neighborhoods is known as "reverse redlining." An-
derson, supra note 5, at 20.
35. Mansfield, supra note 16, at 549-50.
36. Id.
37. Bagley, supra note 33, at 2278.
38. Motto, supra note 12, at 861.
39. In one case, a seventy-six-year-old woman fell behind on her mortgage due to a
sudden and expensive illness. After she refinanced her mortgage, her monthly
payment increased to $1300 from $664 and she and her 101-year-old mother were
soon evicted from their home. Id.
40. Riley, supra note 3, at 354.
41. Johnson, supra note 6, at 651.
42. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1263.
43. Id. at 1262-63.
44. Id. at 1263.
45. Riley, supra note 3, at 354.
46. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 22.
47. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1262.
48. Id. Predatory lenders typically only lend at 70-80% loan-to-value ratios, which
generally enables them to buy the property at the foreclosure sale and sell it for a
profit. Mortgage Lending Abuses: Testimony Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of William J. Brennan, Jr., Director,
Home Defense Program, Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc.).
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tion, shifting unsecured debt into mortgage-backed loans, refinancing at
higher interest rates without economic justification, and enforcing pre-
payment provisions. 49 In short, a predatory lender financially exploits an
unsophisticated or vulnerable borrower through lending practices struc-
tured to result in net harm to the borrower.5 0
Predatory lending is lucrative. Brokers and lenders or their assignees
collect large up-front fees when a loan is made, enjoy above-market inter-
est rates, profit from pre-payment penalties, and stand ready to recover
their investment through foreclosure proceedings.51 The primary attrac-
tion to thinly capitalized lenders is the ability to sell quickly mortgages in
the secondary market for cash.52 This liquidity, along with the absence of
mainstream lenders in low-income neighborhoods, the availability of tax
breaks only on loans secured by home mortgages, and the appreciation of
real estate values converged to create fertile ground for predatory
lending.5 3
Predatory lending imparts significant costs on society. Foreclosures
have a negative impact on neighborhoods, where vacant houses decrease
property values and increase crime.5 4 Every foreclosed home decreases
the value of other homes in the same neighborhood by an average of 1.5
percent.55 On a broader scale, predatory lending practices can devastate
the whole economy:
Rising interest rates collapsed the housing bubble, which caused a
wave of subprime mortgage defaults and foreclosures. That, in turn,
froze corporate credit markets as risk-averse investors stopped buy-
ing esoteric mortgage-backed securities and led to big losses at bond
insurers. . . [It is] a daisy chain of financial disaster, . . . [with o]ne
crises begetting another ... Put simply, this means a tightening of
credit across the spectrum-from mortgages to credit cards to auto
and student loans-that robs consumers of their confidence, further
constricting credit and stopping the economy in its tracks. Result: a
full-blown recession as nasty as Americans have seen in a
generation.56
49. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1263-64. One notorious predatory lender, Asso-
ciates First Capital, refinanced zero-interest loans made for beneficiaries of the
Habitat for Humanity program! See also Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging
the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported
Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2006).
50. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1260; Bagley, supra note 33, at 2278.
51. Forrester, supra note 49, at 1314-15.
52. Bagley, supra note 33, at 2279-80.
53. Motto, supra note 12, at 859-60.
54. Forrester, supra note 49, at 1315.




IV. PROPHYLACTICS TO PREDATORY LENDING
A. POLICY DEBATE
The predatory lending "domino" has toppled the whole economy.
57
Just about anyone with an opinion on the matter will concede that a
"problem of some sort exists," but how the problem should be fixed is
ripe with controversy. 58 What some would consider predatory, others
(including borrowers) may consider beneficial. 59 To be sure, certain lend-
ing practices or loan features, often considered to be predatory, can be
appropriate in some situations.60 For example, a pre-payment penalty, if
bargained for to negotiate a lower interest rate, could be desirable. 6 1 As
Texas Congressman Jeb Hensarling pointed out, "for all the subprime
loans that have gone bad, millions and millions of Americans have had
the opportunity to own their first home because of the subprime mar-
ket."'62 The issue of when subprime lending becomes harmful to society
thus remains unresolved and paramount to the resolution of the debate.
Unfortunately, once "bad" lending activities are isolated, no consensus
exists on how to address them.
B. LAISSEZ-FAIRE ECONOMICS
To neoclassical economists and free-market advocates, the market-
place-Adam Smith's "invisible hand"-will solve predatory lending
problems. 63 The theory posits that if predatory lending is a profitable
endeavor, competitors will enter the marketplace and eventually restore
equilibrium. 64 Competition would then improve the terms and conditions
of subprime loans, eliminating many of the predatory terms and
conditions.
Critics of industry regulation claim that government involvement is the
problem, not the solution. 65 They argue that government sponsored enti-
ties such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac channel funds to areas where
they were not most economically viable, upsetting marketplace equilib-
rium as a result.66 These critics further contend that Federal Reserve's
57. Id.
58. Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending
By Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can
Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 521 (2007).
59. The debate is not without "lines in the sand." The federal government and most
states have enacted laws capping the amount of interest that can legally be charged
on loans, and many states have created predatory lending "matrixes" which "set
forth a recipe of terms that can combine to create a predatory loan." Id. at 550
n.26.
60. Forrester, supra note 49, at 1315-16.
61. Id. at 1316 n.79.
62. 153 Cong. Rec. 178, H13966 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Hensarling).
63. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1299.
64. Id.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 111 (2007) (statement of Rep. Paul).
66. See id.
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monetary policy persuades unqualified borrowers to borrow money to
buy homes they cannot afford. 67
Laissez-faire economics is premised on "free choice and the responsi-
bility to accept the consequences of one's own actions. ' 68 A laissez-faire
approach to predatory lending has failed-and will continue to fail-be-
cause the subprime mortgage marketplace is not an efficient one. Preda-
tory lending involves not the exercise of, but the suppression of, free
choice. By preying on the poor, elderly, and uneducated, predatory lend-
ers "target vulnerable homeowners who do not understand what they are
signing."' 69 For the borrowers, "[t]he choice is between two evils, one of
which is certain [the overdue tax, utility, or medical bills] and the other of
which is ill understood [the predatory loan]." '70
Another argument posited by economic purists is grounded in the prin-
ciple of freedom to contract.71 Proponents of this view believe that peo-
ple should be free to bargain as they see appropriate, and, as "rational
actors who knowingly and freely consent to the terms of their contracts"
should be held to the bargains they strike.72 In this context, protection
from predatory loans is grounded in the law of contracts. 73
Under contract law, the doctrine of unconscionability is the proper po-
licing mechanism for unfair contracts, 74 and the judiciary-not the legis-
lature-is the proper forum for remedying unfair contracts. 75
Unconscionability is defined as "an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea-
sonably favorable to the other party."' 76 If a contract is found to be un-
conscionable, a court may limit the application of any unconscionable
portion (including the whole contract) to avoid an unconscionable re-
sult.77 Generally, to prove a contract unconscionable, a plaintiff must es-
tablish that both the process by which the contract was formed and the
terms of the contract itself are unconscionable. 78 A contract that is fair to
both parties will not be struck down simply because the parties were not
in equal bargaining positions. Similarly, a contract that is inherently un-
67. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1299.
68. Id. at 1358.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 725, 726 (2005).
72. Id. This view presumes the existence of the efficient marketplace mentioned
above, where parties negotiate freely and without biases. Id.
73. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1299.
74. Id.
75. Financial Services Committee Considers New Mortgage Lending Reform Proposals,
89 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 946 (Dec. 10, 2007). Note that unconscionabil-
ity is a defense, and not an affirmative cause of action that will support recovery of
damages.
76. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1300 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
78. See Arthur Allen Lett, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-88 (1967).
H.R. 3915
fair to one party will be upheld if it was freely negotiated by that party.79
The equitable defense of unconscionability, while appropriate in the-
ory, is illusory in practice. Practical limits are placed upon its usefulness
to borrowers. Unconscionability is a question of law, so it is taken out of
the province of the often sympathetic jury.80 It is difficult to prove and
expensive to litigate.81 Most predatory loans simply do not "shock the
conscience" of the court. Since unconscionability is a defense and not a
cause of action, it leaves aggrieved borrowers with no recourse at all un-
less they are first sued for default by the lender. 82 Also, since most pred-
atory loans are sold as securities, the "holder-in-due-course" doctrine
often negates the unconscionability defense.83 Unconscionability has
been defined not as a sword in a defendant's scabbard, but something
more akin to a "wet noodle. '84
C. MAJOR FEDERAL LAWS ADDRESSING PREDATORY LENDING
Economic theories and the common law notwithstanding, Congress has
passed a scattering of statutes in reaction to perceived lending abuses.
This legislation has addressed the issue from a variety of angles, including
antifraud laws such as Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 85 consumer
education and counseling programs like the Home Equity Conversion
Manager program,86 antidiscrimination laws such as The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 197487 and the Fair Housing Act, 88 and disclosure
requirements through the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),89 the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), 90 and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). 91 Because the disclosure statutes
most directly focus on concerns over predatory lending, this paper exam-
ines them in some detail.
79. See generally id.
80. 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:11 (4th ed. 1998).
81. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1301.
82. LORD, supra note 80, at 18:1.
83. The doctrine holds that a good-faith assignee for value of a negotiable instrument
takes it free of all claims and personal defenses it did not have notice of upon
assignment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 749 (8th ed. 2004).
84. Roy Ryden Anderson, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law
Class Lecture (Mar. 18, 2008).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 58 (2006). The FTCA "prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in or affecting trade or commerce." Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1303.
86. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1303. The Home Equity Conversion manager
program is mandatory only for older homeowners considering a reverse mortgage,
and is administered by the Department of Housing & Urban Development
(HUD).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 note (2006).
88. See 42 U.S.C § 3601 note (2000).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 note.
90. Pub. L. 103-225, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). HOEPA is a 1994 amendment to TILA.
91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2006).
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1. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
Congress enacted RESPA to provide homebuyers with effective disclo-
sure of loan settlement costs and to eliminate kickback and referral
fees. 92 RESPA requires that lenders provide to borrowers a good-faith
estimate of closing costs (GFE) within three days of credit application. 93
Additionally, lenders must use HUD-1 settlement statements to provide
actual costs at closing.94 Unfortunately, RESPA has very few teeth in
terms of compelling accurate disclosure because there is no requirement
that lenders advise borrowers of their right to view final settlement state-
ments before closing,95 and lenders have no liability for errors in GFEs or
HUD-1 settlement statements.96 "The result is lengthy and confusing
GFEs and .. .HUD-1 settlement statements that are too late and too
unreliable to be meaningful to the consumers they are meant to serve."'97
RESPA limits kickbacks and referral fees by allowing payments only to
persons who "actually render" services to a borrower.98 A private right
of action exists if a borrower can prove the lender failed to inform the
borrower that the loan could be transferred, received a kickback, or
steered the borrower to a particular company in exchange for a referral
fee. 99
2. The Truth in Lending Act
The purpose of TILA is to provide borrowers with a "meaningful dis-
closure of credit terms" against which consumers can consider the true
cost of credit and to encourage and facilitate comparison shopping.100
Any material aspect of the loan must be disclosed to the borrower, in-
cluding annual percentage rate, finance charges, total amount financed,
total dollar amount of payments, payments schedules, and any voluntary
credit life insurance.101
If the loan is secured by the borrower's home, the Act provides a pow-
erful and important three-day right of rescission. 10 2 A borrower may ex-
ercise the rescission option during the three business days following the
latest of (i) the consummation of the loan, (ii) notification by lender of
borrower's right to rescind, or (iii) delivery of all material and correctly
92. Kahrer v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
93. 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (c)-(d). See also Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 259
F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1147 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(a).
95. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1269.
96. Id. at 1306. Incredibly, no liability accrues for failure to provide a GFE altogether.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Brookstone Mortg. Co., 415 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (S.D. Ohio
2005).
97. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1307.
98. Motto, supra note 12, at 880.
99. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(f)(1), 2607(d)(5) (2006).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
101. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18 (2008). "Material" is held to a reasonable consumer standard.
See Motto, supra note 12, at n.65.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (2008).
H.R. 3915
made disclosures. 10 3 Failure of the lender to document precisely material
loan terms or to notify the borrower of his rescission right extends the
right of rescission to three years. 1°4
If a borrower elects to rescind the loan agreement, the security interest
is automatically voided and the lender or his assignee has twenty days to
void the mortgage and refund or credit the borrower any money paid on
the loan. The court may award the borrower statutory damages of
$2,000-$4,000 if the lender does not respond to a proper rescission re-
quest by the borrower. 10 5 Besides rescission, statutory and actual dam-
ages are available under TILA.10 6 Actual damages are difficult to obtain
because the borrower must prove detrimental reliance on the erroneous
disclosure.107 TILA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limita-
tions.10 8 Violators of TILA are also subject to criminal penalties. 10 9
A major drawback of TILA is the number of loopholes that allow sig-
nificant costs to be excluded from disclosure calculations, which under-
states the true cost of offered credit." 0 Such exclusions include fees for
credit reports, inspections, appraisals, title searches, document prepara-
tion, notaries, and recording."' Many borrowers, especially those sus-
ceptible to predatory lenders, are not aware that these charges are not
included in the disclosed costs of the loan. Moreover, since most borrow-
ers do not have the ability to choose meaningfully between loans, rescis-
sion is of little avail.
3. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
HOEPA was enacted as an amendment to TILA,112 and was passed
amid concerns over reverse redlining.11 3 HOEPA restrictions apply to
any creditor who makes two or more qualified loans in any twelve-month
period. 4 HOEPA applies only to home equity loans, not purchase
money home mortgages, reverse mortgages, or open lines of credit." 5
A loan triggers HOEPA requirements if the annual percentage rate
(APR) exceeds the treasury yield by 8 percent on a first-lien loan or by 10
percent on subordinate loans, or if total points and fees paid exceed 8
103. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (a)(3).
104. Id. This essentially gives borrowers the right to ward off foreclosure during this
period. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1306.
105. Riley, supra note 3, at 356.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006).
107. See, e.g., Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001).
108. Riley, supra note 3, at 356.
109. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1269.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 53.
113. Id. See also supra note 34.
114. Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2006).
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percent of the total loan amount, or $400, whichever is greater. 1 6 A trig-
gered HOEPA loan prohibits (i) balloon payments on any non-bridge
loan with a maturity of less than five years, (ii) negative amortization, (iii)
more than two advance payments from the proceeds of the loan, and (iv)
a default interest rate. 1 7 HOEPA also places restrictions on prepayment
penalties.' 18 Additionally, a lender is prohibited from refinancing a
HOEPA loan within twelve months of closing unless doing so is in the
borrower's best interest.' 19
Three days before closing a HOEPA loan, the lender must disclose to
the borrower in writing the APR, the dollar amount of all payments, the
size of any balloon payments, and total amount borrowed on the loan.' 20
If the interest rate is adjustable, the lender must inform the borrower that
the interest rate could increase and what the maximum payment could
be.12' The lender must disclose in writing that the borrower is not obli-
gated to close the loan because he submitted an application, and that he
could lose his home if the loan is foreclosed. 122 Finally, in an effort to
thwart asset-based lending, a lender subject to a HOEPA loan must docu-
ment evidence of a borrower's creditworthiness and ability to repay the
loan.' 23
HOEPA provides a borrower the same remedies available under
TILA. 124 In addition, the FTC and the states' attorneys general are au-
thorized to initiate HOEPA actions on behalf of consumers. 25 Impor-
tantly, HOEPA abrogates the holder in due course doctrine and
preserves a borrowers claim against an assignee, unless the assignee can
show that a "reasonable person" would not have realized the loan to be
regulated by HOEPA. 126
HOEPA is an improvement over TILA and RESPA in terms of recog-
nizing predatory lending practices. 27 Critics, however, rightfully point
out that it is exceedingly easy for predatory lenders to escape its pur-
view.' 28 HOEPA triggers are so high that most predatory lenders simply
price their loans below them and make up the difference by charging for
items that are excluded from disclosure. 29 Furthermore, as previously
116. Id. See also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1307. The $400 threshold is subject
to indexing, and was recently amended to include costs for optional credit, acci-
dent, life, health, and loss of income insurance. Riley, supra note 3, at 355.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d)-(g) (2006).
118. Riley, supra note 3, at 355.
119. Forrester, supra note 49, at 1317-18.
120. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1305.
121. Id. The "total amount borrowed" must include the cost of any optional insurance
included in any refinance loan. Id.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (a)(1).
123. Riley, supra note 3, at 355.
124. HUD Report, supra note 4, at 54.
125. Id.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1) (2006).
127. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1307.
128. Forrester, supra note 49, at 1317.
129. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1307-08.
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mentioned, HOEPA does not apply to purchase-money loans, reverse
mortgages, or home-equity lines of credit. 130 HOEPA "has strong pro-
scriptions but at best covers [only] the costliest five percent of subprime
home loans."1 31 In the war on predatory lending, HOEPA is akin to a
sub-machine gun with only one bullet in the magazine.
Federal laws have been under-inclusive and riddled with loopholes.
The current major federal disclosure statutes are effective only if those to
whom the information is disclosed properly act on it, and thus put the
onus of action on the borrower, not the lender. 132 Under RESPA, no
private right of action exists if a borrower fails to comply with the fee
disclosure requirements, rendering the disclosure function practically
moot. 133 A right of rescission, such as is provided in TILA and HOEPA,
is a powerful weapon in a borrower's arsenal, but one that is seldom used.
Rescission typically is an unattractive option for someone who desper-
ately needs money. Moreover, HOEPA, the legislation most carefully
targeted to address predatory lending, is easily avoidable, and lenders
who are purposeful predators easily pirouette around the law. 134
D. THE SUITABILITY DOCTRINE
Because of the ineffectiveness of economic models and legislation in
curbing the ills of predatory lending, certain groups argue that a "suitabil-
ity" standard be imposed on the mortgage industry. 35 The doctrine re-
places caveat emptor with a fiduciary relationship. 36 Generally, such a
standard would prescribe underwriting standards, impose a duty of fair
dealing between a borrower and lender, demand that a lender evaluate
whether a particular product is best suited to a borrower, and provide the
borrower with a private right of action. 137 The theory behind the suitabil-
ity standard is that predatory lending involves a mismatch between bor-
rower and lender that would be mitigated by a professional relationship
between the two parties. 138
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2006).
131. Engel & McCoy, supra note 25, at 2069.
132. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1317-18.
133. Motto, supra note 12, at 880-82.
134. Engel & McCoy, supra note 25, at 2069
135. Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry In Crisis, 124
BANKING L.J. 407, 414 (2007). It also has been argued that variants of the suitabil-
ity doctrine can be imposed on sub-groups within the mortgage industry, such as
enacting assignee liability for failure to conduct due diligence in screening loans.
See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 25, at 2089-2103.
136. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1334.
137. Tashman, supra note 135, at 414.
138. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If The Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the Suitabil-
ity Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10 J. AF-
FORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 117, 119-20 (2001). Such a professional
relationship is compared to that between a doctor and a patient or an attorney,
accountant, or broker/dealer and client. Id.
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Suitability has its origins in federal securities law. 139 The National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers adopted the concept in the late 1930s; the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) subsequently promulgated
suitability requirements under the antifraud provisions of the federal se-
curities laws. 140 The SEC believed that the backbone of the "special rela-
tionship" between broker and investor is that the broker "impliedly
represents [that] he has an adequate basis for the opinions he renders."1 41
Proponents argue that since suitability has been successful in regulating
and maintaining stability in the "province of the affluent," it should be
equally appropriate as a protective measure against financial products
"peddled to the poorest rung in society."'142 It "shifts the responsibility
for making inappropriate decisions from the consumer to the [provider],"
from the oft-times ignorant and naYve party to the informed and more
capable one.143
A suitability regime would set a standard against which potential loans
would be measured. 144 The standard would evolve with changing market
conditions, practices, and products and would be applied to each loan
based on the borrower's unique set of circumstances. 45 To deem a loan
"suitable", a lender would make a reasonable inquiry into the borrower's
objectives, needs, and financial circumstances to determine whether they
match the parameters of the loan. 146 A loan made inside the standards
would be prima facie legitimate, a loan outside the standards, prima facie
predatory. 147 Because the lender would be a fiduciary to the borrower,
the borrower would be assured that a loan was priced properly based on
the lender's risk. 148 Finally, the lender would be required to disclose fully
the terms and conditions of the loan. 149
Enforcement would be trifurcated among the government, private indi-
viduals, and industry self-regulation. 50 Ideally, the mortgage industry,
rather than the government, would set standards and adopt "rules of fair
dealing and practices.'' The government would require the industry to
form a self-regulatory organization and mortgage brokers and lenders to
139. The concept of suitability is not limited to the securities arena. Versions can also
be found in the commodities trading and insurance industries. Engel & McCoy,
supra note 9, at 1319.
140. Id.at 1318.
141. See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 369 (4th ed. 2007)
(quoting Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969)).
142. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1319.
143. Ehrenberg, supra note 138, at 120.
144. Id. at 125.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 126.
147. Id. at 126-27. Of course, a lender could avoid liability by showing that a unique
facts, conditions, or circumstances rendered the loan "standard," notwithstanding
it falling outside of industry norms.
148. Id. at 125.
149. Id. at 126.
150. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1337.
151. The option to self-regulate would be the "carrot," and the threat of direct govern-
ment regulation, the "stick." Id.
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join the organization in order to conduct business. 152 In the event a
lender breached his fiduciary duty or the duty of fair dealing, a borrower
would be able to recover damages. The loan transaction could also be
"unwound" or reformed to conform to industry standards. 153 Private and
class actions would be encouraged.1 54
Imposing suitability requirements in the mortgage arena is not a new or
novel concept. Several states as well as the federal government have in-
cluded suitability requirements in pieces of legislation.1 55 Generally,
these efforts have been ineffective because they are either too narrow or
too broad. 156 Critics of the suitability doctrine claim there would be a
general tightening of credit as lenders, reluctant to expose themselves to
the risks involved, would leave the marketplace. 157 Suitability require-
ments could result in overall credit constraints, as fewer people would
qualify for loans. 158 A self-regulatory scheme would be expensive to im-
plement, and critics fear the cost would be passed along to the consumer
in the form of more expensive credit.' 59 Pundits also argue that that a
suitability standard would make it easier for unhappy borrowers to shirk
their repayment obligations by disingenuously claiming their loans to be
unsuitable, which would be a litigious and expensive question of fact.' 60
Whatever the burdens of a new system, many fear they would fall dispro-
portionately on minorities-especially on African Americans and
Hispanics. 161
Adopting the doctrine of suitability to the mortgage context is a com-
pelling argument. 162 A major advantage of the suitability doctrine is that
it places the burden of action on the party most able to effectively effect
that action-the lender. Economic theory postulates that the party that
can avoid a given harm for the least cost should bear the cost of avoid-
ance. 163 Certainly, lenders are in the best position to avoid predatory
lending; borrowers, in dire financial straits, may unwittingly promote it.
The biggest downside to adopting the suitability doctrine is articulated by
152. Id. at 1338-39.
153. Ehrenberg, supra note 138, at 127.
154. Id. at 126.
155. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1319-20. For example, HOEPA requires lenders
of high-cost loans to consider a borrower's ability to repay the loan. See supra
note 123.
156. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1319-20. HOEPA, for example, does not address
the problem of "steering" a borrower to a more expensive, if not beneficial, loan,
and is too narrow. Likewise, most legislation is too broad in that it does not give
lenders guidance on how to comply. Id.
157. Tashman, supra note 135, at 415.
158. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1359-60. Supporters of the suitability theory
claim this as a positive, not a negative. Presumably, the loans that would be denied
likely would have been predatory under the current system.
159. Tashman, supra note 135, at 415.
160. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1359.
161. Tashman, supra note 135, at 413. In 2006, 55% of loans made to African-Ameri-
cans, and 46% made to Hispanics, were subprime.
162. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1330-31.
163. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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posing several questions: would a truly predatory lender join a profes-
sional organization, register with the government, and become a legiti-
mate player in the mortgage game? Or would he move further
underground, where his actions would be even harder to regulate than
they are under the current regulatory regime? Wouldn't then the most
desperate borrowers be dealing not only with predatory lenders, but
criminals as well? 164 A suitability regime might remove the problem
from the legitimate mortgage industry, but also may create an "under-
ground" market with little or no regulation at all.
The possibility of a consumer losing free choice in what to purchase
certainly is an affront to the free-market capital system. Even under se-
curities law, investors-and not brokers-make the ultimate decision on
what investments to buy. The only restriction is on the broker's ability to
recommend certain investments. 165 Related to this point is the reality
that some, perhaps many, people who attempt to borrow money from
legitimate lenders would be denied credit altogether-credit that, despite
the terms, otherwise would be beneficial to the borrower. For many peo-
ple, the freedom to contract would be restricted because a third party
would be responsible for determining what is suitable for the consumer's
needs. 166 In this regard, the suitability doctrine goes too far.
V. THE MORTGAGE REFORM AND ANTI-PREDATORY
LENDING ACT OF 2007
"In response to the crisis caused by aggressive subprime lending and
other abuses in this lending area," the resulting fallout of which "has
roiled not just the mortgage industry, but the larger U.S. economy as
well," 167 the House passed The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act ("Bill" or "House Bill") on November 15, 2007,168 "[a]n
Act to amend the Truth in Lending Act to reform consumer mortgage
practices and provide accountability for such practices, to establish licens-
ing and registration requirements for residential mortgage originators,
[and] to provide certain minimum standards for consumer mortgage
loans .... ,"169 The House Bill seeks to enhance federal regulation over
mortgage origination while "preserving state regulation and innovative
164. The author is reminded of the popular National Rifle Association slogan: "If guns
are outlawed, only criminals will have guns."
165. STEINBERG, supra note 141, at 369.
166. This is a major difference between the application of the suitability doctrine in the
securities and mortgage settings. The doctrine states a securities broker or dealer
cannot offer an unsuitable security to his client. However, nothing says the inves-
tor can't purchase the security if he is so inclined. The decision lies with the con-
sumer. This would not be the case in the mortgage setting, where the decision
would lie with the provider.
167. Mortgage Reform Bill Advances in House, 26 Jan. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8 (2007).
168. Id.
169. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th
Cong. (2007).
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protection for borrowers. '1 70 The Bill is proactive and long-term rather
than reactionary and short sighted. As noted in the Financial Services
Committee Reports, the purpose of the Bill "is [to] reform mortgage
lending practices to avert a recurrence of the current situation of rising
defaults and foreclosures, especially in the subprime market. '1 7
1
A. SUMMARY OF THE HOUSE BILL
The House Bill, as reported by the Financial Services Committee,
establishes a Federal duty of care for mortgage originators; prohibits
steering consumers to mortgages with predatory characteristics and
steering consumers who qualify for prime mortgages to subprime
mortgages; establishes a licensing and registration regime for loan
originators; sets minimum standards for mortgages requiring that
consumers must have a reasonable ability to repay at the time the
mortgage is consummated and that the mortgage must provide a net
tangible benefit to the consumer; attaches limited liability to those
who securitize mortgages that violate the minimum standards; ex-
pands and enhances consumer protections for 'high-cost loans' under
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act; requires additional
disclosures to consumers; [and] establishes an Office of Housing
Counseling within the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment .... 172
Title I of the Bill addresses "residential mortgage loan origination" and
provides for the licensing and registration of "residential mortgage loan
originators." 173 All such originators would be subject to a federal duty of
care, which requires them, inter alia, to present consumers with appropri-
ate loans, disclose fully the costs and benefits of each loan, and notify the
borrower that the originator is not the borrower's agent. 174 Title II sets
"minimum standards" for mortgages, including the ability to repay the
loan and the requirement of a "net tangible benefit" for refinancing of
residential loans.' 75 Loans that do meet minimum standards would allow
consumers to initiate causes of action for rescission of the loan against
both assignees and securitizers. t76 A safe harbor exists for loans and
mortgages that document lender income and underwriting standards,
have no negative amortization, and APRs that vary less than three-per-
cent over an interest rate index. 177
170. Mortgage Reform Bill Advances in House, supra note 167, at 8.
171. H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 35 (2007) (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 35-36.
173. H.R. 3915 § 103.
174. Id. § 122; see also Despite Consumer, Industry Misgivings Mortgage Reform Bill
Wins Bipartisan Vote, 89 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 809 (Nov. 19, 2007).
175. H.R. 3915, §§ 201-202.
176. Mortgage Reform Bill Advances in House, supra note 167, at 8. Assignees and
securitizers can avoid rescission liability if they conform the loan to standards
within 90 days, or if the seller of the loan misrepresents the loan's qualifications
under the standard. Id.
177. Id.
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Title III of the Bill defines and prohibits certain practices pertaining to
"high-cost" mortgages and both amends and adds requirements under
TILA. 78 These requirements generally deal with prepayment penalties,
balloon payments, late fees, and ability to repay debt. 179 Title IV estab-
lishes an "Office of Housing Counseling" within the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, as well as a Director of Housing
Counseling. 180 The primary goal of the new office will be "research,
grant administration, public outreach, and policy development relating
to" home ownership.' 8' Title V promulgates a Universal Mortgage Dis-
closure to be used in all HUD-1 settlement statements, 82 and Title VI
amends TILA regarding certain escrow accounts for consumer transac-
tions.183 Finally, Title VII amends TILA with regard to certain appraisal
activities.t 84
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
North Carolina Congressmen Brad Miller and Melvin Watt began
working on the House Bill in 2003 as a result of the "irrational exuber-
ance" they observed in the real estate market.185 Representative Watt
recollected on the House floor that "lending was becoming more availa-
ble, but it was also becoming more irresponsible because it was viewed as
a no-lose proposition."' 186 The legislation originally consisted only of the
provisions currently contained in Title III regarding predatory loans, but
grew in complexity and coverage as the foreclosure crisis transformed
from threat to reality.' 87 The Bill was approved by the Financial Services
Committee on November 6 by a vote of forty-five to nineteen.' 88 On
November 15, the Bill was debated on the floor of the House. Following
the debates, the House passed the Bill by a vote of 291 to 127.189
Supporters of the Bill were motivated to drive "the scourge" of preda-
tory lending that is "rocking the economy" and to ensure the mortgage
industry follows "sound principles of consumer protection" to "improve
the options available to [residents] who seek a mortgage."' 90 Indeed, the
tone of some supporters was that home ownership is more akin to a right
rather than a privilege-that "every American deserves the opportunity
to achieve the American Dream of homeownership," and that Congress
178. H.R. 3915, §§ 302-303.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 402. The only counseling currently required under federal law is for reverse
mortgages under the Home Equity Conversion program. See supra note 87.
181. H.R. 3915, § 402.
182. Id. § 501.
183. Id. § 601.
184. Id. § 701.
185. 153 CONG. REC. 177, H13979 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. Watt).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at H13964.
189. Id. at H14037
190. 153 CONG. REC. 184, E2487-E2488 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Schakowsky).
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should take "meaningful, commonsense steps to help more American
families achieve that dream." 191 However, other legislators were more
tempered in their explanation of legislative intent.
Congressman Barney Frank, Chairman of the Financial Services Com-
mittee, pointed out that the Bill is designed to fix problems caused by
unscrupulous and unregulated brokers in the secondary market. 92 He
was quick to note that loan originators subject to banking regulations
were neither the cause of the problem nor the target of this proposed
legislation. 193 Instead, the legislation takes regulations that apply to the
banking industry and applies them to all mortgage professionals.1 94 Con-
gresswoman Carolyn Maloney of New York commented before the
House that the Bill was "carefully crafted" legislation and the product of
"a fair, open, and bi-partisan process."' 95 She noted that any proposal
,'must be done in a way that does not disrupt what is working correctly"
and "must strike a very careful balance that provides enhanced consumer
protections without unnecessarily limiting the availability of loans to
creditworthy borrowers."1 96 Maloney summarized that "this bill contains
a number of provisions that strengthen underwriting standards and pro-
vide additional protections for consumers while not unduly constraining
sound lending and the secondary market."1 97
Despite being labeled a bi-partisan effort, the Bill faces critics on both
sides of the aisle and the issue.198 Consumer advocates feel the Bill
should impose tougher liability and sanctions on predatory lenders, and
object to liability limitations for investment banks and other investors. 199
Many have criticized the bill's preemption of state predatory or deceptive
lending laws, calling for the Bill to provide a regulatory floor, not a ceil-
ing.200 Congressman Watt noted that it is these preemption provisions
which became the most controversial during committee hearings and de-
bates, and admitted "we have had trouble finding the language to do
that" and that "there is some angst among a number of us about the pre-
emption language."'20 1 The "angst" to which Watt is referring is that fed-
eral preemption potentially could eliminate the option of state-law claims
against securitizers or owners of mortgage loans.202
On the other side of the issue, some fear the Bill would have the "nega-
tive unintended impact" of denying creditworthy consumers "their share
191. 153 CONG. REC. 177 at H13964 (statement of Rep. Altmire).






198. Mortgage Reform Bill Advances in House, supra note 167, at 113. One Republi-
can, Alabama Congressman Spencer Bachus, sponsored the Bill, along with
twenty-six Democrats.
199. Id.
200. 153 CONG. REC. 184 at E2488 (statement of Rep. Schakowsky).
201. 153 CONG. REC. 177 at H13979.
202. 153 CONG. REC. 184 at E2488.
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of the American dream of home ownership. '20 3 Members of the Finan-
cial Services Committee were concerned that "the accommodation of
subprime borrowers through flexible underwriting will be sharply cur-
tailed, to the detriment of many borrowers who, experience has shown,
can and do repay their loans." 204 They noted that "lenders will be very
hesitant to make loans ... because they will be unable to dispose of even
unmeritorious litigation through a motion to dismiss, and thus will incur
significant additional costs and exposure. ' 20 5 During floor debates, Con-
gressman Hensarling characterized this situation as a "trial attorney's
dream and a homeowner's nightmare. '20 6 California Representative Ed
Royce warned the House that the "murky language" of the legislation
would invite litigation from "every borrower who misses a payment. '20 7
Another concern of critics is the imposition of assignee liability under
Title II. With uncertainty lurking regarding holder-liability on mortgage-
backed securities, some fear investors will flock elsewhere, leading to a
less-liquid market.20 8 This uncertainty equates to added risk - the cost of
which will ultimately be borne by subprime borrowers. 20 9 Congressman
Royce, advocating a free market solution, pointed to signs of "self-correc-
tion" in the mortgage market, which in his opinion rendered the House
Bill both unnecessary and counterproductive. 210
Supporters of the Bill almost seem encouraged by the criticism. One of
the sponsors claims the lack of support from both consumer and industry
groups indicates "that we are in about the right place in achieving a non-
political, legislative remedy to address this issue of such great impact to
our economy and our families." 211 Another supporter sees the Bill as
apolitical out of necessity rather than by design, commenting on the
House floor that "we in Congress have to work with almost everything.
It is sort of like making sausage... We have to try to come up with a bill
that, first of all, we can get through Congress. '212 Congressman Frank
echoed this sentiment, noting that although the Bill will "probably leave
all parties at interest a little bit unhappy ... [and] given the competing
interests here, that is the best we can do."'213
C. PROGNOSIS
Unfortunately and predictably, the future of the House Bill is uncer-
tain. It was sent to the Senate on December 3, 2007, and was immedi-
203. Despite Consumer, Industry Misgivings Mortgage Reform Bill Wins Bipartisan
Vote, supra note 174.
204. H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 108 (2007).
205. Id.
206. 153 CONG. REC. 177 at H13967.
207. See, e.g., id. at H13979 (statement of Rep. Royce).
208. Id. at H13966 (statement of Rep. Hensarling).
209. Id. at H13979 (statement of Rep. Royce).
210. Id.at H13979-80.
211. Id. (statement of Rep. Bachus).
212. Id. at H13965 (statement of Rep. Scott).
213. Id. at H13967.
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ately referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs.214 On December 12, 2007, Senate Banking Committee Chairman
Christopher Dodd introduced legislation (the "Senate Bill") largely mir-
roring the House Bill.2 15 Key differences do exist-some favoring con-
sumers and others mortgage companies. For example, the Senate Bill
does not contain a minimum standards safe-harbor provision for assign-
ees, but does not require registration of mortgage professionals. 216 The
Senate Bill is "regarded primarily as an initial bid by [Dodd] to begin a
legislative dialog," and no action is expected to be taken in the Senate
until 2008 at the earliest. 217
The White House "offered only mild praise for the [House] legislation
and expressed strong reservations about its key provisions . . . 'because it
includes provisions that unduly restrict access to credit for potential
homebuyers and reduces re-financing opportunities for current home-
owners.' ''218 Nevertheless, Chairman Frank said he did not interpret
these comments as "a threat to veto the bill."'219
The House Bill goes a long way toward incorporating major advantages
of the suitability doctrine, including requiring registration of mortgage
professionals and setting standards against which loans are measured. 220
The Bill, in defining "minimum loan standards," would remove many
predatory lending terms and practices, thus protecting those who cannot
make a reasonable or informed decision. In such instances, the integrity
of the market would not be compromised because the transaction would
not have been at arm's length in the first place. Loans that do not meet
minimum standards would be hard to sell on the secondary mortgage
market since investors and securitizers would not have liability protection
against the borrower. The ability to sell mortgages is a huge incentive for
many predatory lenders, closing a major loophole in the system that
HOEPA left open. This effectively would shift the cost of avoiding harm
from borrowers to lenders, an efficient economic allocation.221
The concerns regarding assignee liability in large part may be a red
herring. HOEPA, as well as legislation in numerous states and cities, al-
214. 153 CONG. REC. 183, S14699 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2007).
215. Dodd Introduces Legislation in Senate to Address Predatory Lending Practices, 89
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1000 (Dec. 17, 2007). As of the date of this paper,
Senator Dodd's proposal had not left the Senate Banking Committee.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Despite Consumer, Industry Misgivings Mortgage Reform Bill Wins Bipartisan
Vote, supra note 174.
219. Id.
220. The Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the American Association of Resi-
dential Mortgage Regulators began a registration program on January 2, 2008.
Seven states require regulation of state-regulated mortgage lenders, brokers, and
originators. Another 38 states, Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico have committed
to participate by the end of 2009. See Nationwide Licensing System for Mortgage
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ready contains assignee liability provisions for certain loans, so the policy
is not new, and the argument concerning the potential restriction of the
credit markets may be unfounded. Two separate studies concluded that
"the typical [assignee liability] law has little impact on the flow of sub-
prime credit as measured by loan origination and application. ' 222 Engel
and McCoy posit that anti-predatory lending laws, which alleviate bor-
rowers' concerns over falling prey to predatory lenders, actually led to
increased applications and originations. 223
The major drawback to the Bill is the lack of crucial industry support.
Without industry input and involvement, any legislation inherently will be
vague and open to interpretation from the courts and administrative
agencies. Faced with this uncertainty, many lenders will consider leaving
the subprime market, rather than working to make it a useful and pru-
dent financial vehicle. Under this scenario, the critics' concerns over
credit constriction seem founded. Legislative history echoes this senti-
ment, with supporters acknowledging the importance of keeping credit
facilities accessible.
Without industry support, it is doubtful the House Bill as it now stands
will survive. The best way to achieve support is through industry involve-
ment, particularly in the determination of minimum standards for safe
harbor loans as well the definition of "ability to repay." Care must be
taken, however, to temper these benchmarks so they do not swallow the
notion of a free market. In short, it is imperative for the Senate to get the
mortgage industry involved as the Bill continues to move through the
legislative process.
Additionally, the Bill should be amended to address concerns over
state preemption. Much like the Federal Trade Commission Act, it
should preempt state law only to the extent that it is more protective. 224
Field preemption will serve no purpose other than to discourage support
by Senators from states that have predatory lending laws in place. To
alienate the very states that have considered and confronted the problem
at hand seems senseless. The "angst" alluded to by Congressman Watt
must be assuaged.225 The protections of the Bill would come at a cost.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that implementing the House
Bill would cost taxpayers $316 million between 2008 and 2112, primarily
related to providing consumer counseling services.226 This amount pales
in comparison, however, to the costs of the current crisis, one that may
well be avoided in the future with the passage of the Bill.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The subprime mortgage market in the United States is fraught with
problems and ripe with ideas on how to fix it. Suggestions range from
doing nothing to completely overhauling the industry. Legislation, pre-
dictably, lurks between the two. This paper has examined predatory
lending as a sub-species of the subprime mortgage market, and suggests
that it has played a major role in the mortgage crisis currently plaguing
the United States. Predatory lending, the long-ignored bastard offspring
of this country's obsession with home ownership, is now at the forefront
of the nation's political agenda. Laissez-faire economics, the doctrine of
freedom to contract, federal disclosure statutes, and the suitability doc-
trine all have been examined as prophylactics to predatory lending.
None, by themselves, have been or will be effective. The suitability doc-
trine is tempting, but may abrogate freedom of contract to an untenable
extent. However, key attributes of the suitability doctrine, namely regis-
tration of industry professionals and the articulation of industry stan-
dards, go a long way toward shifting the cost of predatory lending from
the borrowers to the lenders. Many of these features exist in the House
Bill.
The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007 is de-
signed to improve the quality of mortgage lending in the United States.
If enacted, it will help prohibit future mortgage crises. It is a long-term
solution, not a reactive quick fix. Given the current state of the mortgage
industry and the economy as a whole, Congress undoubtedly feels pres-
sured to offer quick solutions. This Bill is not one of them, and is not a
panacea for our current woes. In its haste to find solutions, Congress
should not lose sight of the importance of well thought out and reasoned
legislation for the long-term financial viability of the mortgage market. It
should not fail to see the forest for the trees. This Bill-already four
years in the making-has potential. It provides many of the advantages
of the suitability doctrine, mitigates free market concerns, and closes
many of the loopholes found in current legislation. The House has done
its part. Now it is the Senate's turn.
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